ОПРАВДАН ЛИ МОРАЛЬНО ТЕРРОРИЗМ?

IS TERRORISM EVER MORALLY JUSTIFIED?

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Аннотация

Терроризм это актуальная тема настоящего времени. Иногда терроризм используют как отдельное организованное преступление, иногда он является частью или средством войны. Вопрос о моральном оправдании терроризма занимает ключевое место в данной статье.

Терроризм – один из вариантов тактики политической борьбы, связанный с применением идеологически мотивированного насилия. Суть терроризма – насилие с целью устрашения. ... Определение терроризма представляется непростой задачей. Формы и методы террористической деятельности существенно менялись со временем.

Annotation

Terrorism is a hot topic of the present time. Sometimes terrorism is used as a separate organized crime, sometimes it is a part or means of war. The question of the moral justification of terrorism occupies a key place in this article.

Terrorism is one of the tactics of political struggle associated with the use of ideologically motivated violence. The essence of terrorism is violence for the purpose of intimidation. ... Defining terrorism is not an easy task. The forms and methods of terrorist activity have changed significantly over time.

Ключевые слова: этика, терроризм, философские подходы, мораль.

Key words: ethics, terrorism, philosophical approaches, morality.

This essay will focus on terrorism, and in particular on terrorism and morality. From the definition of terrorism, it follows that this phenomenon is aimed at intimidating (terror) other people, harming them in order to persuade them to make decisions that are in the interests of the terrorist.

But the phenomenon of terrorism is much more than just a definition. This is an act that cannot be perceived unambiguously - at least because the phenomenon of terrorism includes both terrorist acts with and without violence. Therefore, the question to be discussed is whether terrorism can be morally justified in general.

This is a versatile phenomenon that is worthy of discussion from the point of view of ethics, since at present the topic is really relevant. Not all people understand the phenomenon of terrorism and not all understand in what manifestations it can be expressed. As society in the course of its industrial development becomes more and more inclined to defend its points of view, to express them, to demand the realization of its rights-the methods of this struggle for rights are also different.

And in the context of the fact that terrorism in its structure to some extent is also a way to achieve its goal - to fulfill the requirements of the terrorist - this can be perceived by people as one of the ways to fight for their rights. Moreover, the morals of the terrorist are different from ours, and they perceive this as a struggle for their rights. But we'll talk about the morals of the terrorist later. Thus, for a number of reasons described above-popularization of the struggle for their rights and a variety of ways to fight for them - I believe that it is necessary to talk about this topic - can terrorism be morally justified?

It is important to note that terrorism as a definition appeared only at the end of the XVIII century, and the emotional subtext that this definition carries in itself often overlaps the main meaning of the term in discussions. Therefore, a detailed, structured

analysis of the nature of this phenomenon is necessary both to understand the moral essence of terrorism and to understand what are the ways to overcome terrorism.

This essay will first focus on the nature of terrorism in general, how it is portrayed in scientific articles of recent decades and what arguments are given to support certain positions. The nature of terrorism will then be examined from the perspective of various philosophical approaches-consequential, non-consequential, and utilitarian. All this will help in the course of the discussion to come to fundamental definitions of morality, justice and basic human rights, and to draw conclusions about whether terrorism can be morally justified.

Terrorism by definition

When we begin to consider a particular social phenomenon, we are interested, first of all, in its essence, distinctive features that allow us to distinguish this phenomenon from a number of other, albeit close, but still different phenomena of social life, we first of all try to define the phenomenon under consideration. The same thing happens in the analysis of terrorism.

And it is not so easy to do this, because this phenomenon has a very complex structure. Terrorism has much in common with other forms of social protest and violence: aggression, armed struggle, military conflicts of varying degrees of intensity, guerrilla actions, sabotage, etc.

Therefore, the abundance of definitions that exists in terrology is quite understandable.

The well-known Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu offers a definition of it as a new form of organized violence directed against democratic societies. The author explains what is the fundamental difference between terrorism and organized crime, which affects commercial firms, the judicial apparatus, and law enforcement agencies in all democratic countries. This new type of violence is significantly different from violence by organized crime in the main - for the purposes of the activities carried out. The goals of organized crime are to achieve financial benefits, the goals of terrorists are always political.

The phenomenon of terror and terrorism is so complex that special legal institutions still cannot give it an exhaustive definition. There is a double standard for murder in certain cultures (killing someone else is justified in the public mind, killing one's own is unacceptable). This leads to the fact that for some a terrorist is a hero, for others a criminal.

For the sake of argument, we will be guided by the definition of terrorism by Primoratz, which is given in the introduction. In my opinion, it fairly accurately reflects the essence of the phenomenon, and the fact that modern society still can not come to a single decision about the definition is an indicative point about how much society as a whole has not yet understood this problem.

All researchers agree that terrorism from all points of view is in the focus of an accentuated public interest, however, there is no strict answer to the question of what it is. There is no definition of terrorism - not even a theoretical definition, about which you can argue as much as you want, but at least a working one that allows you to identify the phenomenon itself and say: this is terrorism, and this is not.

Terrorism historically

Probably, terror in the personal and public consciousness of people has existed for centuries, since the formation of the archetype "we-they", "friend-foe". There is information that three hundred and forty years before our era, the father of Alexander the Great was killed in a terrorist attack.

An example of the oldest organization that used terror as a means of political struggle is the Sicarii, a religious sect of fanatics who fought in 60-70 AD against Roman domination and socio-political oppression, for the restoration of the Jewish state.

A number of terrorist organizations, mainly of religious and fanatical orientation, also operated in medieval Europe. Apparently, the practice of the Jesuit Order, which became the striking force of the Counter-Reformation and acted on the principle of "the end justifies the means", should be considered terrorist in nature. Thus, the medieval theologian F. Aquinas justified execution in the name of saving

citizenship; the Florentine theologian Antoninus advocated the forcible removal of a person harmful to society. In the XI - XIII centuries. on the territory of Persia, Syria, Lebanon, assassins operated, terrorizing adherents of Islam (Sunni), Crusaders and Christians, killing caliphs, prefects, governors and even rulers: they destroyed the Jerusalem King Conrad of Montferrat. Murder was a ritual for the sectarians, they welcomed martyrdom and death in the name of the idea and firmly believed in the advent of a new world order.

In the sixteenth century, an organization of professional murderers-stranglers emerged in India, whose ideological origins were religious dogmas associated with the Indian goddess of destruction Kali. Secret terrorist organizations also influenced public life in medieval China.

The founder of state terrorism, many researchers tend to consider the leader of the Jacobin dictatorship M. Robespierre, who organized the trial of King Ludwig XVI and his execution. In the same vein, his supporter Saint Just made a statement: "every person has the right to kill a tyrant, and the people cannot take away this right from any of their citizens."

The two most famous doctrines justifying terror are the "bomb philosophy" and "propaganda by deed". The "philosophy of the bomb" appeared in the XIX century, its ardent supporter and founder of the theory of terrorism in its modern sense is considered to be the German radical Karl Heinzgen. He was convinced that the "highest interests of humanity" are worth any sacrifice, even if it is a question of mass destruction of innocent people. Heinzgen believed that the power of reactionary troops should be countered by such weapons, with which a small group of people can create maximum chaos, and called for the search for new means of destruction.

The concepts of "bomb philosophy" and "propaganda by deed" were continued in the theory of fascism, which emerged in Italy and Germany at the beginning of the XX century. It was a terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary forces, characterized by the use of extreme forms of violence, chauvinism, racism, anti-Semitism, ideas of military expansion and the omnipotence of the state apparatus. A bloody terror was

unleashed on all democratic and liberal movements, and all actual and potential opponents of the Nazi regime were physically destroyed. The mechanism of dictatorship created in fascist Germany included the terrorist apparatus distinguished by extreme cruelty: the SA, the SS, the Gestapo, the "People's Tribunal", etc. Under the influence of Italy and Germany, fascist-type regimes were established in Spain, Hungary, Austria, Poland, and Romania. Fascism was a deadly threat to all mankind, calling into question the existence of many peoples. A carefully developed system of mass destruction of people was used, according to some estimates, about 18 million people of all nationalities of Europe passed through concentration camps.

So, regarding the time of the emergence of terrorism, the opinions of historians and political scientists differ quite noticeably. Others equate any political assassination with terrorism, and thus the roots of terrorism are pushed back to ancient times (W. Lacker). if not in an even earlier period; others consider terrorism a phenomenon of the late twentieth century (I. Alexander), V. Chalikova, etc.). The French historian M. Ferro ascribes terrorism to the "specific Islamic tradition of the Khoshashins of the XI-XII centuries", and N. Neymark relates the origin of modern terrorism to the era of the post-Napoleonic Restoration.

The motives of terrorism

Participation in terrorist organizations and actions is caused by diverse complex psychological complexes, internal and external motives that give a certain meaning to the actions of their participants, as well as certain socio-economic moments.

But the terrorist act itself is committed by people. It is they who pick up a dagger, a bomb, a rifle, press a button to take the life of another person in the name of a"holy goal". Why do people become terrorists, what pushes them to the path of terrorism, what are the foundations of this phenomenon?

First, these are mercantile motives. Terror, like any sphere of human activity, has a certain economic and financial dimension. For example, in Afghanistan, there was a detailed scale of payment for various terrorist acts: blowing up a car, an armored

personnel carrier, destroying a bridge, killing a private, junior and senior officer, a civilian, etc.

Secondly, ideological motives. These are more stable motives based on the coincidence of a person's own values, his ideological positions with the ideological values of a group, organization, political party or any other ideological and political force. Such motives are guided by a person who feels involved in some community (people, tribe, clan). In this case, terror becomes his blood business.

Third, the motives of transformation, active changes in the world. As a rule, motives of this kind are more or less inherent, first of all, in people who are professionally engaged in terror. For them, terror is both a tool and a goal of transforming the world.

Fourth, the motive of his power over people. The "drug of power" affects individuals sometimes more than a natural or synthetic pathogen. In the view of such people, power rests not on authority, but on violence, on fear.

Fifth, the motive of interest and attractiveness of terror as a field of activity. It often attracts not only people from marginal circles, but also from the well-off and educated. For example, Bin Laden came from a millionaire's family. But for ideological and religious reasons, he went to Afghanistan, where he became one of the organizers (as a CIA agent) of terrorist training camps. Western analysts noted in 2005, in connection with the terrorist attacks in the UK, that among those who brought destruction and chaos, were mostly from wealthy families.

Sixth, "comradely" motives of emotional attachment in a variety of ways-from the motive of revenge for the harm caused to comrades in the struggle, co-religionists, to the motives of traditional participation in terror because it was engaged in by someone from friends, relatives, tribesmen or co-religionists.

Seventh, the motive of self-realization, self-affirmation. Such self-realization, which turns into self-destruction, means, first of all, the recognition of the fact of psychological destruction of the individual.

Terrorism and different philosophical approaches

If we consider the consequential approach, then within its framework, only the consequences of a particular practice are subject to condemnation. That is, terrorism itself - as a phenomenon - cannot be considered unacceptable, according to the consequentialist point of view. It is subject to condemnation only if it resulted in harm, bad consequences. This is a distinctive feature of this approach.

Scientists themselves, who look at terrorism in accordance with this point of view, are divided in how they evaluate it from the point of view of morality. In particular, the conclusion depends on how a person imagines and evaluates the benefit that appears as a result of terrorist actions.

Within the framework of the judgment on justified terrorism, Kai Nielsen believes that the use of neither political violence nor terrorism can be unequivocally excluded-it depends on what benefits these actions bring, how they achieve their moral and political goals. For example, the achievement of a “truly socialist society” or liberation from the domination of the colonialists.

"When and where [one of the two approaches] will be applied is a tactical issue that needs to be addressed... on a case-by-case basis… how to choose a weapon in war".

Thus, according to Nielsen, the justification of terrorism is possible only in the case of worthy political and moral consequences of the act.

First, the choice of terrorism as a method of achieving the goal is justified if it is a politically effective tool of the revolutionary struggle.

Secondly, if there are really good reasons to say that it is by choosing this method that there will be less suffering and injustice in the world.

In this way, a kind of balance is achieved that allows for the moral justification of terrorism. According to this concept, the moral justification of terrorism can be equated with the moral justification of legal punishment, which can be very severe and cruel, but is justified by the need to preserve the security of society.

Within the framework of the concept of consequences, two approaches are distinguished. According to the first approach, terrorism has a moral justification.

Thus, one of the adherents of this approach, K. Nelsen, believes that terrorism can be justified by its political results and moral consequences. The moral justification of terrorism is permissible, according to K. Nelsen, in two cases: 1) when terrorist acts are a politically effective weapon in the revolutionary struggle; 2) if, as a result of terrorist acts, injustice, suffering, and decline in the world are overcome, which would be impossible to overcome in other ways.

Historical experience, according to K. Nelsen, shows that terrorism on a small scale, used as the only method of struggle in order to raise the masses to the revolutionary struggle, is ineffective and counterproductive. On the other hand, terrorism, used as a method of guerrilla warfare in a protracted war for freedom, can be quite effective, and therefore justified, as happened in Algeria or South Vietnam. It should be noted that the point of view of K. Nelsen is not new, and was expressed in the 1920s by L. Trotsky.

Another approach within the framework of the concept of consequences does not justify terrorism. One of the representatives of this approach, N. Foushn, believes that although some forms of terrorism can be justified in certain circumstances, such circumstances are extremely rare. The following conditions are necessary for the moral justification of terrorism: 1) the result achieved by a terrorist act must be good enough to justify such a method of achieving it; 2) the result can be achieved by terrorism; 3) the result could not be achieved by any other means that would require less moral and other costs.

Terrorists are not really able to comply with these conditions, according to N. Foushn, because they cannot be observed when it comes to innocent victims of terrorism. N. Foushn emphasizes that for terrorists, all innocent victims are tools for achieving a certain goal and are not perceived as human beings, while the guilty victims are declared as human beings, because they must be punished. Innocent victims are presented by terrorists as human beings only to show what incredible sacrifices terrorists are forced to make, and thus to increase the effect of terror. The terrorists claim that they were forced to sacrifice the precious lives of innocent people in the

name of a high goal, because they had no alternative. But N. Fouchn states that terrorists always have alternatives, so terrorist acts in which innocent people are victims have no justification. As for terrorist acts aimed at the direct perpetrators of human misfortunes, they in some cases deserve justification, N. Foushn believes.

The concept of the consequences of terrorism is criticized by those philosophers who believe that terrorism is inherently absolutely wrong, but its consequences should not affect its moral justification or condemnation in any way. This concept of distributive justice and human rights considers several approaches. Thus, V. Held studies the problem of terrorism and morality from the point of view of distributive justice and human rights. She explains that sometimes the rights of a person or group of people are in conflict when the rights of others are violated in order to protect or respect the rights of some people. In some conflicts, there is no way to respect the rights of all parties and therefore a choice is made. Terrorists undoubtedly violate the rights of their victims, but on the other hand, they claim that they do so because their rights have also been violated. But this in no way gives a moral justification for terrorism, says V. Held, because one more condition must be met - the distribution of justice. If in a society one part of the population has the privilege of observing their human rights, and the same rights of another part of the population are violated, then terrorism arises against representatives of the privileged group to restore justice in the distribution of human rights. Such restoration of justice to ensure the rights of all members of society serves as a moral justification for the use of terrorism, V. Held believes. This refers to a society in which human rights have been violated and which is now in the process of moving from violating the rights of individuals to respecting the rights of all members of society. Human rights violations would continue, and therefore the use of terrorist methods to restore them can be morally justified.

According to V. heald approach to moral justification of terrorism, violations of the rights of victims of terrorism, such as the right to life and right to security is inevitable and demand that these violations were distributed fairly among members of society, as well as the rights.

An analysis of the two approaches outlined above shows that justice and human rights factors have more weight than positive and negative consequences when considering the issue of terrorism from a moral point of view, and therefore dominate in conflict situations. However, in some exceptional circumstances, the impact factor is more important.

M. Walzer, in his concept of extreme necessity and moral distress, cites as an argument the "bombing of terror" of German cities during the Second World War. At the beginning of 1942, Great Britain was on the verge of defeat and could not avoid it if it continued to fight in accordance with the rules of war. Great Britain at that time remained the only country that was not conquered by the Nazis. And if Germany had conquered Great Britain, the consequences would have been immeasurably more terrible, according to M. Waltzer. That is, the UK was in a state of emergency because of: a) the impending threat to its existence; b) the unthinkable moral damage that would have been inflicted on British society in the event of a Fascist victory. In this situation, Great Britain violated the basic moral principle of the inviolability of the civilian population by bombing German cities with the aim of instilling terror or terror among the civilian population, in order to force them to put pressure on their Government and end the war by surrendering unconditionally. As a result of those bombings, 600,000 civilians were killed and 800,000 wounded. A year later, by the beginning of 1943, it was clear that Great Britain was close to victory and the bombing of terror had lost its moral justification, which was provided by society at the beginning.

M. Walzer believes that his concept of a state of emergency applies only to a political community that is under threat of destruction or enslavement, and, ultimately, to a society that can be deprived of freedom and survival. "The survival and freedom of political communities, whose members share the lifestyle they received from their ancestors in order to pass it on to their children, are the highest values of the international community," writes M. Walzer.

In the concept of M. Walzer, critics distinguish two components: 1) the physical survival of society, for which the use of terror has a moral justification; 2) the political

survival of the state system or the salvation of the political independence of society, which may have a political justification, but not a moral one. M. Walzer's concept is one-sided, critics say, because by focusing on the extreme and monstrous nature of the threat, it ignores the monstrous sacrifices that terrorism brings.

There is also an approach that proves that terrorism has absolutely no moral justification. Within the framework of this approach, the concept of selective terrorism considers that all forms of terrorism, with the exception of selective terrorism, which is aimed at the direct perpetrators of the ills of society, cannot be morally justified.

The concept of absolute law is presented in the ethical theory of A. Gevrit, which highlights freedom and security as fundamental prerequisites in the question of terrorism and morality. Freedom and security require an absolute right to their protection, a right that all innocent victims should have. When the absolute status of a given right is put to the test because of an extreme threat to society or its moral catastrophe, it is necessary to draw a moral distinction between direct and indirect responsibility for the fact that the safety of civilians was not ensured.

Continuing to develop further the ethical theory, P. Bon argues that if a society or individuals refuse to use methods of terror against those who commit atrocities and atrocities, in order to prevent innocent victims, and because of this cruelty and atrocities will continue, then the direct moral responsibility for this is borne only by the perpetrators of atrocities. That is why terrorism has no moral justification.

S. Nathanson's concept of absolute inviolability of citizens requires a complete ban on terrorist methods of struggle and believes that respect for the absolute inviolability of citizens is the best way to reduce the number of innocent victims and destruction during armed conflicts. Criticizing the concept of the state of emergency, S. Nathanson believes that the violation of the inviolability of citizens even in the most emergency situations allows the justification of terrorism, which, in turn, contributes to its more frequent use.

While supporting the concept of S. Nathanson, R. Brandt and W. Hooker do not believe that civil immunity should be absolute. They believe that it is necessary to

observe such a moral rule that allows and even requires preventing the occurrence of a state of emergency, even if it requires the violation of some other moral rules, in order to prevent the use of terrorism, which inevitably leads to innocent victims.

Conclusion

In general, philosophical concepts are divided into those that study the idea of the innocence of victims of terrorism, i.e. civilians, and those that consider selective terrorism aimed directly at the perpetrators of social problems, primarily social injustice, repression against civilians and others. Despite the fact that the findings of the studies analyzed in this article demonstrate diametrically opposite points of view on this problem, the researchers conclude that the answer to the question of whether there is a moral justification for terrorism depends on who becomes a victim of terror.

The problem of further research of the moral aspect of terrorism is extremely relevant, because it has an important applied value in the ideological fight against terrorism. The moral justification of terrorism remains one of the most important components of terrorist propaganda, which shows the desire of terrorists to gain public support and is aimed at recruiting supporters. Therefore, the effectiveness of measures to counter terrorism depends on how successfully the factor of moral condemnation of terrorism is studied and applied in these measures, because moral condemnation by society deprives terrorists of public support.

So what is the answer to the original essay question? If you answer the question specifically, then yes, terrorism can be ever justified. But from the point of view of some of the philosophical approaches that we have considered in this essay. Terrorism continues to be studied. Now, while massively there is not even a generally accepted definition, it is difficult to talk about this topic. The only truth is that certain philosophical approaches allow the justification of terrorism, rejecting basic human rights, and the transition to some utilitarian position - if it does well enough for a certain number of people, then it is permissible to sacrifice others. I don't think so. It seems to me that these philosophical approaches, which undoubtedly appeal to the concepts of the common good, the benefit to society, the long-term perspective, erase the person,

they do not care about the people, the victims, and the families of those who suffered. I believe that terrorism cannot be morally justified under any circumstances. The fact is that yes, it can be used to achieve some goal, political or social, but it is impossible to justify harm to innocent people in order to achieve the goals of terrorists.

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